We analyze on-the-job search when moral hazard among employees calls for incentive schemes that include deferred compensation. While deferred compensation improves the workers'incentives to exert e¤ort, it distorts the workers'on-the-job search decisions. We show that deferred compensation is less attractive when overall turnover in the market is high. Moreower, the interplay between search frictions and wage contracts creates feedback e¤ects. If …rms in equilibrium use contracts with deferred compensation, entry of new …rms into the on-the-job search market becomes less profitable. We …nd that multiple equilibria may exist: a low-turnover equilibrium where …rms use deferred compensation to motivate workers, and a high-turnover equilibrium where they do not.
Introduction
The high worker turnover rates in the economy has spurred a signi…cant literature on on-thejob search. In this literature, the focus is on the role of search. In particular, the models in this literature abstract from any agency problems that may exist between workers and …rms along other dimensions than on-the-job search. In the present paper we argue that optimal incentive schemes that motivate workers to provide e¤ort may include an inter temporal element, and this element may interfere with on-the-job search decisions.
Our starting point is that reallocation of workers on …rms is necessary in order to obtain an e¢ cient allocation of resources, as experienced workers may have comparative advantage at di¤erent tasks and in di¤erent …rms than inexperienced workers. To capture this we set up an on-the-job search model where experienced workers search for new jobs. E¢ cient onthe-job search then requires that the experienced workers'wage in the original …rm should equal their future production value in that …rm (like in Moen and Rosén 2004) .
The new feature of our model is that we include moral hazard caused by imperfect monitoring. As in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) , …rms can only imperfectly monitor worker e¤ort. We follow Lazear (1979 Lazear ( , 1981 and allow …rms to use deferred compensation to provide incentives for workers to provide e¤ort. With deferred compensation, an experienced worker's wage exceeds her productivity. As a result we get a tension: A moral hazard problem which calls for deferred compensation and optimal on-the-job search which calls for wages equal to marginal productivity.
We …rst show that incentives systems based on deferred compensation become less attractive when turnover is more important for economic e¢ ciency. More interestingly there are feedback e¤ects between the wage contracts used by …rms and the number of …rms searching for employed workers. These feedback e¤ects may lead to multiple equilibria: A high-e¤ort /low-turnover equilibrium in which …rms use deferred compensation to motivate workers, and a low e¤ort -high-turnover equilibrium in which they do not. Furthermore, the larger are the search frictions in the market, the more likely is it that the high-e¤ort/low turnover equilibrium emerges.
As an extension we show that …rms in a low-turnover equilibrium with deferred compen-sation are more reluctant to use piece rate payments to motivate workers, and more inclined to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital, than are …rms in a high-turnover equilibrium.
Our paper o¤ers a new explanation for the large variations in turnover rates across countries and regions. For instance, in 1999 the median tenure among employees in 1991 was 3.0 years in the US and 4.4 years in UK, while it was 7.5 years in Germany and 8.2 years in Japan. The percentage of workers with a tenure of less than one year was 28.8 percent in the U.S. and 18.6 % in the U.K., 12.8 % in Germany and only 9.8% in Japan (OECD 1993) . Large di¤erences in turnover rates also exist between regions of the same country.
For instance, turnover rates are extremely high in Silicon Valley, but much lower along "Route 128" in Massachusetts, another prosperous area with well developed high-technology industry (Saxenian, 1994) .
Our model predicts that …rms in countries (or regions) with lower turnover rates rely more on long-term wage contracts with deferred compensation (seniority-based wages, promotions etc.) and less on short-term performance-based systems than do …rms in countries (regions) with higher turnover rates. This implication is in accordance with popular conceptions of the di¤erences between the US and Japan and between Silicon Valley and Route 128. 1 The prediction of a negative relationship between deferred compensation and short-term performance pay is supported by Bayo-Moriones et.al. (2004) . They document that …rms which use deferred compensation less than other …rms tend to use short-term performance pay as an incentive mechanism.
Related literature Our paper proposes an explanation for di¤erences in turnover between countries and regions. In a recent paper, Pries and Rogerson (2005) argues that the di¤erences in worker turnover between the US and Europe may be explained by institutional factors. There also exist papers that analyze multiple equilibrium turnover rates. Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) develop a model where adverse selection may lead to multiplicity in quit rates. Related arguments are made in Chang and Wang (1995) , Owan (2004) , Saint-Paul (1995) , and Moene and Wallerstein (1997) . Morita (2001) shows how multiple turnover rates may arise as a result of …rms'choice of production technology and learning-by-doing.
Our paper di¤ers from this literature in several ways. First, multiplicity in our model is caused by incentive contracts and worker moral hazard. Second, our paper is the only one that explicitly model on-the-job search as an equilibrium outcome in the presence of search frictions.
The second contribution of our paper is that we introduce private information into a model of on-the-job search. There is currently a small, but thriving literature on private information in search models. Moen and Rosen (2009) introduce moral hazard and Guerrieri (2008) asymmetric information in competitive search equilibrium. Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright (2009) analyze self-selection of heterogenous workers in a in search environment, and Rudanko (2009) and Menzio and Moen (2009) analyze optimal insurance with limited commitment in a search context. We contribute to this literature by analyzing the relationship between (intertemporal) wage contracts and on-the-job search.
Also related are extensions of the Burdett -Mortensen model (Burdett and Mortensen 1998) which allow for back-loading of wages, see Burdett and Coles (2003) and Stevens (2004) . We want to point out that the mechanism at play in these papers is very di¤erent from the one in our paper. In their models, search is ine¢ cient from the point of view incumbent …rm and the employee, as it reduces their joint income. The employer discourages job quits by back-loading wages (but never to the extent that the wage is higher than output).
In our model, by contrast, on-the-job search is e¢ cient, as it increases the joint value of the incumbent …rm and the employee. Back-loading is used to motivate workers to exert e¤ort, and implies that wages for senior workers exceed output. Reduced on-the-job search then comes as a costly and unintended by-product of this back-loading.
Finally, as deferred compensation plays an important role in our paper, it is interesting to note that several empirical studies do suggest that deferred compensation is important. Medo¤ and Abraham (1980) …nd that pay increases with seniority, although supervisors' rating of performance do not. Lazear and Moore (1984) compare age-income pro…les for tenured workers and for self-employed workers, for whom there exists no agency problems.
They …nd that the returns to seniority are higher for tenured workers, and attribute this to deferred compensation. Katlikof and Gokhale (1992) compare wages and productivity of more than 300,000 workers in a Fortune 1000 …rm. They …nd a substantial degree of deferred compensation for all categories of workers. In particular, managers' productivity exceeds compensation by a factor of more than two at the age of 35, while the opposite is true at the age of 57. Barth (1997) documents that workers on piece-rate compensation schemes have neglible returns to seniority, while workers who are not paid by piece-rates earn signi…cant returns to seniority.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our model. Section 3 de…nes equilibrium and section 4 characterize equilibrium. Section 5 analyzes multiple equilibria.
In section 6 we study implications for contractible e¤ort, …rm-speci…c human capital and entrepreneurship. Section 7 discusses our main assumptions and section 8 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
The Model
We study an overlapping generations model where workers live for two periods. The economy is inhabited by two types of …rms, ordinary …rms and specialized …rms. All workers start their career in ordinary …rms. After the …rst period they qualify for a job in a specialized …rm, where their productivity is higher. However, …nding a specialized job is hard due to search frictions. All agents are risk neutral with zero discount rate. As there is no interaction between the generations, each generation can be studied in isolation.
Ordinary …rms may employ both young and old workers. The productivity of a young worker in an ordinary …rm is y 1 +e, where e 2 f0; eg is her e¤ort level. The cost of e¤ort is ec, c 2 (0; 1). We introduce a moral hazard problem which may call for deferred compensation, and do this in the simplest possible way by assuming that the e¤ort level of a worker …rst can be observed in the following period. This may re ‡ect that e¤ort is hard and timeconsuming to observe, for instance because it takes time to complete the project the worker is participating in and the e¤ort level cannot be observed before the project is completed.
Alternative model speci…cations that give rise to deferred compensation is presented in the discussion section. Old workers make no e¤ort choice, and produce y 2 units in ordinary …rms and y p units in specialized …rms, y p > y 2 .
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For simplicity, we assume that the labor market for jobs in ordinary …rms is Walratian.
In the labor market for jobs in specialized …rms, search frictions are non-neglible. There are unmatched agents on both side of the market, and wages are determined by bargaining.
Free entry of both …rm types implies zero pro…ts in equilibrium.
Ordinary …rms go into a period with a set of existing (old) employees. Specialized …rms only hire old workers, and therefore have new workers each period. Each period is divided into four stages, the hiring stage, the production stage, the remuneration stage and the search stage.
Ordinary …rms
At the hiring stage, ordinary …rms hire young workers. The new employees are o¤ered a wage schedule ! = fw 1 ; w 2 (e)g, where w 1 2 R denotes the wage in the current period and w 2 (e) : f0; eg ! R is the wage in the next period, given that the worker is still employed in that …rm.
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At the production stage, junior workers choose e¤ort level e and produce y 1 + e units of output. At the remuneration stage, the workers are paid their wages according to the contract.
At the search stage, junior workers search for specialized jobs. This is costly. A search intensity of s implies an e¤ort cost of s 2 =2.
If on-the-job search is unsucsessfull, the worker may chose to switch to another ordinary 2 Several arguments support that turnover can be e¢ cient. Workers may try out several jobs to determine their comparative advantage (Johnson, 1978) or because of match-speci…c productivity di¤erences (Jovanovic, 1979) . A worker's relative productivity in di¤erent …rms may also change over time as she gains experience and expertise (Moen and Rosén, 2004) . Furthermore, sectorial shocks to the economy may warrant a reallocation of workers. Finally, with technological progress, e¢ cient dissemination of knowledge may require turnover as workers may learn from each other (Saxenian, 1994) . The main results of this paper also hold under the less restrictive assumption that only some rather than all workers have a higher productivity in search …rms and that only those workers engage in search. 3 We assume that …rms don't pay workers who have left the …rm. This may be because: a) It is hard to verify whether movers had high e¤ort in the …rst period. b) A …rm's reputation may su¤er more from breaking the contract if the worker in question is still employed than if she has quitted. c) Deferred compensation may re ‡ect the (expected) gain from promotions. As argued in Carmichael (1983) , it may be easier for a …rm to commit to promotions than to cash payments not associated with particular positions, e) It may be easier for a worker to retaliate in informal ways after a breach of contract if she is still employed than if she works in another …rm. …rm and gets a one-period wage equal to her productivity y 2 . Thus, if the period 2 wage prescribed by the initial contract is less than y 2 , the worker will certainly leave.
Specialized …rms
At the search stage the specialist …rms enter the search market at a cost K. The search cost K has to be repeated in each period the …rm searches for workers. They bargain with their workers over the wage. The resulting bargained wage is denoted by w p . At the production stage the workers produce without any moral hazard problems, and in the remuneration phase the workers receive a wage according to the contract.
Matching
Matching takes place between the periods. The number of matches between searching workers and specialized …rms is determined by a constant return to scale matching function x(su; v), where u is the measure of searching workers, s their average search intensity, and v the measure of vacancies posted by specialized …rms. We assume that the matching function is Cobb-Douglas, i.e., x(su; v) = A(su) v (1)
where = v=su. 4 The probability of …nding a job for a worker with search intensity s is sp.
In equilibrium we require that sp 1. 5 For technical reasons we allow q to be greater than one (hence a …rm can attract and hire more than one worker).
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Bargaining and search equilibrium 4 We may think of our matching process as a reduced form of a matching process set in continuous time. The probability of …nding a job may then be interpreted more broadly as the fraction of the available time the worker is in the specialized …rm.
5 Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (2006) have pointed out that coordination externalities associated with multiple applications may arise in a discrete setting if workers can obtain more than one o¤er and has to choose between them. However, the coordination externality disapears if the matching processes is set in continuos time or if …rms may give a job o¤er to more applicants if the …rst applicant(s) turn down the o¤er (Kircher, 2008) . 6 The alternative is to impose the constraint that x(u; v) v. While clearly doable, this is inconvenient for the existence and e¢ ciency proofs.
When bargaining, the outside option of the worker is the contracted wage w 2 in the ordinary …rm. In order to avoid uninteresting technicalities we assume that w 2 is unobservable to the specialized …rm, which only knows the distribution of wages in the economy. 7 As we only consider pure strategy equilibria, all workers in equilibrium have the same fallback wage w 2 , and this equilibrium wage is thus the outside option of the workers. The outside option of the …rms are zero. Wages are determined by the Hosios condition (Hosios, 1990) , i.e., the Nash sharing rule with the worker's bargaining power equal to . In Appendix 7 we show that the search equilibrium maximizes the income of searching workers subject to the zero pro…t condition of …rms.
It follows from the bargaining game that the wage in a specialized …rm is given by
The expected income to a specialized …rm from entering the market is
where the last equation follows from entry. From (1) and (2) it follows that q = A 1 1 p 1 .
Substituting q = A 1 1 p 1 and (3) into the zero pro…t condition (4) gives
which uniquely pins down p as a function of w 2 .
Parameter assumptions
In order to ensure that the market for specialized …rms is operating, we have to make assumptions on the productivity di¤erential between specialized …rms and ordinary …rms relative to the cost of opening a specialized vacancy, also in the case with deferred compensation. More speci…cally, we make the following assumption:
In addition we have to make parameter assumptions to ensure that the probability of …nding a job, ps, is strictly lower than 1 in equilibrium.
Why the assumptions on the parameters take exactly these forms will be clear in lemma 3 and 4.
Equilibrium
Before characterizing the equilibrium of the model we make observation: In order to retain an old worker that has not obtained a job o¤er in a specialized …rm, the wage contract has to specify a wage w 2 (e) y 2 . We refer to this as the worker's interim participation constraint.
As we will see shortly, the interim participation constraint does not bind if the worker exerts e¤ort. If the worker does not exert e¤ort, the …rm is indi¤erent between retaining the worker at wage y 2 and letting the worker go. We assume without loss of generality that the wage schedule satis…es the worker's interim participation constraint. Thus, the expected utility of a worker is,
The pro…t of an ordinary …rm reads (!; e; s) = y 1 + e w 1 + (1 sp)(y 2 w 2 (e)):
Let u denote the expected utility of a young worker that enters the market. The optimal contract can be de…ned as follows:
De…nition 1 The optimal contract (e !; e e; e s) is a wage schedule e ! = f e w 1 ; e w 2 (e)g, an e¤ort
level e e, and a search intensity e s that solves max (!; e; s) subject to 1. Incentive compatibility:
u(e !; e e; e s) = max e;s u(e !; e):
Interim participation:
e w 2 (e) y 2 ; e 2 f0; eg:
u(e !; e e; e s) u:
We are now ready to de…ne the equilibrium.
De…nition 2 The equilibrium is a contract (! ; e ; s ), a job …nding rate p , a wage w p and a utility u such that 1. The contract (! ; e ; s ) is an optimal contract.
2. Equilibrium in the search market: w p and p solve (3) and (5).
3. Zero pro…t of ordinary …rms: (! ; e ; s ) = 0.
Characterizing equilibrium
In this section we characterize equilibrium. Inserting the participation constraint u u, where u is given by (6), into the expression for the …rm's pro…t (7) gives (with the participation constraint binding)
where
is the value of search (the functional dependence on p and w p is suppressed). De…ne max = max s (s) and let s max denote the corresponding value of s. Then
Then consider a worker's search behaviour. Incentive compatibility requires that e s maximizes u(e !; e e; s), and from (6) the …rst order condition of this maximization problem reads
By comparing (12) and (10) it follows that the worker maximizes the value of search if and only if w 2 (e e) = y 2 , in which case there is no externality on the …rm from the worker's search behavior. De…ne
We refer to L as the (deadweight) loss associated with ine¢ cent search intensity when w 2 (e e) 6 = y 2 . The pro…t function (8) can thus be written as
Let D w 2 (e e) y 2 denote the amount of deferred compensation the worker receives. If the …rm implements e¤ort, D > 0.
Lemma 1
The loss L is a function of p and D, and reads
Proof. See Appendix 1
The loss is increasing in the amount of deferred payment D and tightness p in the search market. The higher D is, the further away is the worker's search intensity from the search intensity that maximizes the value of search. The same is true for p. In addition, a the higher is p, the the more it matters that the search intensity is too low. Hence deferred compensation is less attractive when the job …nding rate in the market is high. Note that the loss is independent of w p .
If the …rm wants to implement high e¤ort, e e = e, it must satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint u(!; e; e s) max s u(!; 0; s). We de…ne a shirker as a worker that deviates and sets e = 0 when the contract prescribes e = e. The contract punishes shirkers as hard as possible, hence the interim participation constraint binds; w 2 (0) = y 2 . Let D = w 2 (e) y 2 denote the lowest amount of deferred compensation consistent with the incentive compatibility constraint. The following then holds:
Furthermore, D is strictly increasing in p, w p and c.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
The value of D has to be higher when the probability that the worker is there to pick it up is low, that is, if p is high or w p is high (since this means that e s is high). If the cost of e¤ort is high, the wage increase if exerting e¤ort must be high.
The structure of the equilibrium depends on whether the …rms implement e¤ort or not.
It is convenient to de…ne two two equilibrium candidates, a no-e¤ort equilibrium candidate (! n ; 0; s n ; p n ; w n p ; u n ) and an e¤ort equilibrium candidate (! e ; e; s e ; p e ; w e p ; u e ). The no-e¤ort (e¤ort) candidate is de…ned in the same way as the equilibrium, with the restriction that the …rms are forced to implement e = 0 (e = e).
Consider …rst a no-e¤ort equilibrium candidate. In this case …rms set D = 0, and
The zero pro…t constraint and (7) implies that w n 1 = y 1 . From (3) and (5) it follows that
Since the right-hand sides only contain exogenous variables, existence and uniqueness of p n and w n p follows directly from equations (17) and (18). Given w n p and p n , equation (10) and (11) uniquely determines s n = s max (w n p ; p n ) and = max (w n p ; p n ). The loss is thus zero,
From (14) and the zero pro…t condition we have that
which uniquely determines u n .
Lemma 3 The no-e¤ort equilibrium candidate exists and is unique. Furthermore, p n > 0 and p n s n < 1.
The …rst part of the lemma (existence and uniqueness) was proved above. The last part is proved in appendix 3, and utilizes assumption 1 and 2.
In order for the no-e¤ort equilibrium candidate to constitute an equilibrium of the full model, the …rms cannot …nd it pro…table to implement e¤ort, i.e., (! n ; 0; s n ) max !;s (!; e; s)
given the market parameters (p n ; w n p ; u n ). If the …rm implements e¤ort, recall that it sets w 2 (0) = y 2 and w 2 (e) = y 2 + D(p n ; w n p ). A deviating …rm thus obtains a pro…t given by (from 14)
For the deviation to be strictly pro…table, has to be strictly positive. By inserting (19) into (20) it follows that the no-e¤ort equilibrium is an equilibrium of the full model if and
i.e, if the loss of value of search due to deferred compensation exceeds the gain from e¤ort.
If (21) is satis…ed, we say that a no-e¤ort equilibrium exists.
Consider then an e¤ort-equilibrium candidate. In order to implement e¤ort, …rms set w 2 (0) = y 2 and w e 2 (e) = y 2 + D(p e ; w e p ) . From (3) and (5) it then follows that
In the appendix we show that (22)- (24) 
which uniquely de…nes u e . Equation (6) The proof is given in appendix 4.
In order for the e¤ort equilibrium candidate to constitute an equilibrium of the full model, the …rms cannot …nt it pro…table to deviate and not implement e¤ort. A neccesary and su¢ cient condition for this is that (! e ; e; s e ) max !;s (!; 0; s), given the market parameters (p e ; w e p ; u e ). A deviating …rm that implements zero e¤ort and sets D = 0, obtains a loss of zero and a pro…t given by (from (14)
Deviation is only strictly pro…table if is strictly positive. By substituting out u e in (27) by the virtiue of (26), it follows that the e¤ort equilibrium candidate is an equilibrium of the full model if and only if
The equation states that the loss of value of search due to deferred compensation is outweighted by the gain from e¤ort. If (28) is satis…ed, we say that an e¤ort equilibrium exists Proposition 1 a) There exists a threshold value c n such that the no-e¤ort equilibrium exists if and only if c c n .
b) There exists a threshold value c e such that the e¤ort equilibrium exists if c c e .
Proof. See Appendix 5.
Note the di¤erence between a) and b). The threshold c n is the unique solution to (21) with equality, and the no-e¤ort equilibrium exists if and only if c c n . However, (28) with equality may have more than one solution. We have therefore de…ned c e as the smallest solution to (28) with equality. Due to continuity such a smallest value always exists. It follows that the e¤ort equilibrium also may exist for values above c e (hence there is no "only if"). The reason why (28) with equality does not necsesarrily have a unique solution is that a higher c implies a higher D (which increases L) but also a lower p e , and this tends to reduce L. In Appendix 6 we show that a su¢ cient condition for (28) with equality having a unique solution (unfortunately in terms of endogenous variables) is that D 1 (y p y 2 ).
We want to illustrate the di¤erent equilibria in a …gure. In appendix 4 we show that the generic expressions (22) and (24) de…nes D as a function of p only, D = e D(p), and that
The curve is upward sloping, re ‡ecting that the higher is the job …nding rate, the larger amount of deferred compensation is necessary to induce e¤ort.
Second, from the zero pro…t condition (5) we can a write p as a function of D,
The curve shows the job …nding rate p that is consistent with the zero pro…t condition for specialized …rms (or free entry condition) as a function of D. The higher is the deferred compensation, the higher is w p , and hence the lower is the number of …rms that enter the market, and hence p F E is lower.
In the p D space the e¤ort equilibrium is obtained at the intersection of the two curves.
The no-e¤ort equilibrium is de…ned by D = 0 and p n = p F E (0). The two equilibria are shown in …gure 1.
Multiple equilibria
In the previous section we derived conditions under which the e¤ort and the no e¤ort equilibrium may exist. An interesting issue is whether they may exist simultaneously. Proof. See Appendix 8.
The proposition is illustrated in the …gure. The no-e¤ort equilibrium existis for c c n .
The e¤ort equilibriun exists for c c e . Multiple equilibria exists if c 2 [c n ; c e ].
The intuition for multiplicity is as follows. Suppose we are in the no-e¤ort equilibrium.
Then w 2 is relatively low, as no …rms defer compensation. Therefore many specialized …rms enter the market and on-the-job search is valuable. If a …rm deviates and defers compensation in order to implements high e¤ort, it has to defer compensation and distort workers'search e¤ort this comes at a high cost (L is high). By contrast, in the e¤ort equilibrium all …rms defer wages, hence few specialized …rms enter the market, and the return from the workers' on-the-job search is lower. A deviating …rms that does not implement a high e¤ort and thus does not defer compensation only obtains a modest increases the value of search, since there are relatively few specialized …rms to search for anyway.
More generally, when all the other …rms use deferred compensation, the search market is "designed" for workers with a high period-two wage, in the sense that the equilibrium maximizes the value of search for such workers. That means few specialized …rms paying high wages. The gain for a worker-…rm pair of improving the incentives for the worker to do on-the-job search is lower in this situation than in the situation where the equilibrium of the search market is designed for workers with a low period two wage, with more specialized …rms paying lower wages.
Put di¤erently, the outcome in the search market depends on the behavior of the agents on the other side of the market, and that will again depend on the agents on the same side of the market. Thus, there exists a feedback e¤ect from the search behavior of the average worker in the market to the gain from search for any individual worker. Since the search behavior depends on the wage contract in question, it follows that the gain from implementing high e¤ort and defer payment depends on the extent to which the other …rms in the market defer compensation.
We want to analyze how the equilibrium con…gurations depend on the parameters of the model. For any parameter z, let M e z=z denote the set of permissible parameters for which the e¤ort equilibrium exists given that z = z. We say that an increase in z makes the e¤ort equilibrium more likely if M e z=z 1 M e z=z 2 for any z 1 < z 2 . Analogously, let M n z=z denote the set of parameters for which the no-e¤ort equilibrium exists given that z = z and de…ne more likely accordingly.
Proposition 3 1) An increase in the search frictions (reduced A, increased K or increased ) makes the e¤ort equilibrium more likely and the no-e¤ort equilibrium less likely.
2) An increase in y p y 2 makes the no-e¤ort equilibrium more likely and the e¤ort equilibrium less likely.
Proof. See Appendix 9.
A reduction in A, as well as an increase in K or , re ‡ects that it becomes more costly to …nd a trading partner in the specialized-…rms submarket, and hence can be interpreted as search frictions being more severe. The proposition states that such a change will tend to favour the e¤ort equilibrium. Increased search frictions implies that the losses associated with distorting the on-the-job search margins becomes less important, and this tends to favour the e¤ort equilibrium.
We also want to analyse under what conditions multiple equilibria is "likely" to occur. This is di¢ cult, as the model is highly nonlinear. However, we can derive a limit result.
First assume that the value of search in the absence of defered compensation is greater than the gain from e¤ort, max > (1 c)e, or (from 11, 3 and 5)
We refer to this as assumption 3. By comparing with assumption 2, we se that the two requirements are consistent for all c 2 [0; 1] if e 1=2. Now suppose the cost of e¤ort ce converges to y 2 y 1 , i.e., towards the border de…ned by assumption 1. We can then show the following result Proposition 4 Suppose assumption 1-3 is satis…ed. Then if y p y 2 is su¢ ciently close to ce, the model exhibits multiple equilibria
The proof is given in Appendix 10. More generally, when ce is relatively large compared with y p y 2 , there is a large di¤erence between p e and p n . This implies that the di¤erence in deadweight loss of implementing e¤ort in the no-e¤ort equilibrium candidate and the e¤ort equilibrium candidate is large, which broadens the scope for multiple equilibria.
Welfare As the workers receive the entire economic surplus, the relevant welfare measure is the utility of workers entering the market, u. From (19) and (26) it follows that the utility in the no-e¤ort and e¤ort equilibrium can be written as.
We show in appendix 7 that the search market maximizes the income of searching workers given the zero pro…t condition of …rms. E¢ ciency in the on-the-job search market is therefore obtained when w 2 = y 2 , as in the no-e¤ort equilibrium. The unconstrained e¢ cient allocation thus requires that e = e; p = p n ; and s = s n . It follows that both equilibria are ine¢ cient.
The no-e¤ort equilibrium because there is no e¤ort. The e¤ort equilibrium is ine¢ cient because there is too little turnover.
Suppose the parameter constellation is such that multiple equilibria exist. We want to explore whether the equilibria can be welfare ranked. The conclusion is negative, one cannot generally show that one of the equilibria welfare dominates the other. The exception is if the e¤ort cost, c; is close to the upper boundary c n for when the high-e¤ort equilibrium exists.
In this case, we have that (from 26 and 19 ) u e y 1 + y 2 + max (p e ; w e p ) < y 1 + y 2 + max (p n ; w p ) = u n :
Hence the low-e¤ort equilibrium welfare dominates the high-e¤ort equilibrium in this case.
To understand why, note that when c = c e , the net gain from e¤ort in e¤ort equilibrium exactly balances the loss associated with distortions in the workers'search intensity. However, since wages are above the workers'productivity, the search market do not maximize the joint gain from search, as too few …rms enter the market. Suppose instead that no …rms implement e¤ort. Then the wages in specialized …rms fall, and more specialized …rms enter the market. Now the search market does maximize the joint gain from search, hence this increases the gain from search and thus also welfare.
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For values of c in the interior of (c n ; c e ), the e¤ort equilibrium may welfare dominate the no-e¤ort equilibrium. To understand, note the following. Given that a …rm implements e¤ort, the joint income from on-the-job search may be higher in the e¤ort equilibrium than in the no e¤ort equilibrium. The reason is that a higher specialized …rm wage will induce more on-the-job search by workers in …rms that defer compensation. This e¤ect may be su¢ ciently strong so that joint value of search for …rms implementing e¤ort may possibly be higher in the e¤ort equilibrium than in the no-e¤ort equilibrium. Hence it is possible that the economy is locked into the no-e¤ort equilibrium although the e¤ort equilibrium is more e¢ cient. With exogenous search intensity of workers, one can show that the no-e¤ort equilibrium always welfare dominates the e¤ort equilibrium.
Implications
In this section we derive predictions from our model, and compare them with existing empirical …ndings where such …ndings exist.
The slope of the wage-tenure curve and turnover An interesting issue is the relationship between the slope of the wage-tenure pro…le in …rms and the turnover rate in the economy. In our model, …rms are identical. Hence all …rms in the market o¤er the same wage contracts. However, since the model exhibits multiple equilibria, di¤erent markets 8 VARA LITE MER EXPANSIVA? TEX KOMMENTERA PÅ VAD SOM HÄNDER UTANFÖR MUL-TIPLICITET.
DISKUTERA HÄR ELLER SENARE OM INTE SÖK-FRIKTIONER-VAD HÄNDER DÅ?
may experience di¤erent outcomes even if the parameter constelations are identical. In the markets were …rms implement e¤ort, wage pro…les are steep and the turnover rate is low, while the opposite is the case the equilibrium with no e¤ort. In this sense the model predicts a negative relationship between the steepness of the wage-tenure pro…le and turnover.
If the parameters di¤er between the regions we may get similar results. Suppose the cost to workers of implementing e¤ort is higher in one industry than another. If …rms implement e¤ort in the low-cost industry and does not in the high-cost economy, there will be a negative relationship between the slope of the wage-tenure pro…le and the turnover rate across the industries. If e¤ort is implemented in both industries, there will be less deferred compensation and more turnover in the industry with high e¤ort costs, since e¤ort here is not implemented. In both situation the model predicts a negative relationship between the steepness of the wage-tenure pro…le and the turnover rate in the economy.
9
In order to analyse within-industry di¤erences (which is relevant case for the empirical studies below) the model may be extended to allow for di¤erences in the cost of implementing e¤ort. 10 Suppose …rms in the industry are hetrogeneous, however, their workers undertake their on-the-job search in the same search market and face the same value of p. For instance, let the cost of e¤ort is low in some …rms and high in other …rms. If both …rm types implement e¤ort, the …rms with high e¤ort costs will have to defer compensation more (have a higher D) than …rms with low e¤ort cost. Turnover rates will be lower in …rms with more deferred compensation, as their workers search less intensively. If …rms where e¤ort costs are high choose not to implement e¤ort, they will not defer compensation at all. If the …rms with low e¤ort costs implement e¤ort, they will still have to defer compensation. Now it is the …rms where e¤ort costs are high that will face the higher turnover rates. In both cases there is a negative relationship between the steepness of the wage-tenure pro…le and the turnover rate in the economy. Similar e¤ects can be obtained if the gain from e¤ort varies between …rms.
Also in this case the …rms that defer compensation most will have the lowest turnover rates. 9 The conclusions are not so clear for all parameter di¤erences. Suppse two industries di¤er in terms of matching e¢ ciency A. Suppose both industries implement e¤ort. The industry with the higher A will have more deferred compensation. The turnover rate in this industry may or may not be higher than in the low-A industry.
10 A formal presentaton of the extension of the model is availiable upon request.
Several papers have investigated empirically the relationship between the wage pro…le o¤ered by …rms and the turnover rate of their employees. Galizzi and Lang study turnover and wage growth within …rms for a set of …rms in Turin, Italy. They argue that the tenuredependent wage growth within a …rm can be proxied by the average wage in that …rm.
Conditional on own wage they …nd that the turnover rate is negatively related to average wages, and conclude from this that a steep wage pro…le reduces turnower. Leonard and Audenrode study wage policy in Belgian manufacturing …rms. They …nd that a one standard deviation increase in return for tenure reduces blue collar quits by 39 percent and white-colar quits by 47 percent. Fairris …nd that quits are lower when the job ladders within …rms are long, pay growth from the bottom to the top of the ladder is high, and seniority is used as a criterion for promotion. Finally, Barth and Dale-Olsen …nd that …rms with a steep tenure-wage pro…le obtains reduced turnover.
The …nding seems to …t well with the predictions of our theory. That being said, other theories may also explain a negative relationship between the slope of the wage-tenure contract and the turnover rate, for instance investments in …rm-speci…c human capital.
When are the di¤erent equilibrium more likely? Our model also have implications for when we can expect to see deferred compensation. First, proposition 3 state that the less frictions there are in the on-the-job search market, the more likely is the no-e¤ort equilibrium and the less likely is the e¤ort equilibrium. This may indicate that in dense areas, with a large number of potential …rms, deferred compensation is less attractive. Similarly, 3 also states that if the productivity di¤erences between the specialized …rms and the ordinary …rms is small, the e¤ort equilibrium is more likely and the no-e¤ort equilibrium is less likely. This may indicate that deferred compensation is more likely when the productivity di¤erences between …rms are relatively small. If …rms contains several jobs of di¤erent types, the probability that a good worker-job match can be found internally increases, and the gain from changing jobs decreases. Again this may call for deferred compensation.
Finally, proposition 4 indicates that multiple equilibria are more likely to occur if the cost of e¤ort is relatively close to the output gap y 2 y 1 . Hence one can expect large di¤erences between contract forms and turnover rates between countries in sectors were the gain from turnover is relatively modest compared to the e¤ort cost. If the …rm does not implement long-term e¤ort, …rms maximize pro…ts given by
It follows trivially that the …rm wants to implement the …rst best level of d, given by
With a linear incentive scheme w 1 = a + b(y 1 + d) this can be implemented by setting b = 1. Since w 2 = y 2 the zero pro…t condition then implies that a = y 1 .
Consider then a …rm that does implement e¤ort (e = e). Let c(d)
Since c tot is strictly convex, increasing in From lemma 2 we know that D is increasing in c.
The pro…t in this case reads
The …rst order condition for d reads
Thus, the marginal e¤ort cost of d is less than one. One may implement this by setting
and have a cap at the bonus obtained at d e , where d e is the e¤ort level the …rm wants to implement. Note that without a cap, a shirking worker will increase d
above d e and increase her utility. This makes it even more tempting to shirk.
Our conclusion is thus that …rms in e¤ort equilibrium will implement less obsverable e¤ort, and be more restrictive in its use of short-term bonuses, than …rms in the no-e¤ort equilibrium. Analogously, if …rms in an industry are exogenous, say regarding the value of long-term e¤ort, the …rms that chose to implement long-term e¤ort will use less incentivepowered short term bonus systems and cut back on short-term e¤ort.
There is some evidence that …rms which use deferred compensation to a lesser extent than other …rms are likely to use short-term bonuses. Bayo-Moriones et.al. (2004) document that …rms which use deferred compensation less than other …rms tend to use short-term performance pay as an incentive mechanism. MORE AT THIS POINT.
Firm-speci…c human capital and entrepreneurs Clearly, the choice of contracts will in ‡uence the incentives of …rms to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital. If a …rm implements e¤ort, the turnover rate is reduced, and the …rm has a higher probability of retaining the worker in the second period. Hence the gain from the …rm-speci…c human capital investments increases.
In addition, the potential to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital makes the e¤ort equilibrium more likely and the no-e¤ort equilibrium less likely. To see this, denote the …rm-speci…c human capital level of a worker by h, and her period-2 productivity in that …rm by y 2 + h.
The wage that implements optimal on-the-job search is then w 2 = y 2 + h. A shirking worker is still payed a wage y 2 if remaining in the …rm in period 2, hence the w 2 (e) is unchanged.
Hence the amount of deferred compensation is reduced to D h, and the loss function (15) can thus be written as
Firm-speci…c human capital thus reduces the loss of implementing e¤ort, and therefore makes the e¤ort equilibrium more likely.
Entrepreneurs are often former employees of …rms in the same industry. Furthermore, entrepreneurs often need access to particular kinds of funding, (e.g., venture capital), for which the market may be thin. The matching process between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs may be similar to the search market described above.
For a potential entrepreneur, the shadow price of becoming an entrepreneur is continued employment. This shadow price is higher with deferred compensation than without.
Furthermore, when bargaining over terms of trade with a venture capitalist, the economic compensation of continued employment is likely to in ‡uence a potential entrepreneur's bargaining position. Thus, in low-turnover equilibrium with deferred compensation, entrepreneurship is less attractive, because the shadow price in terms of foregone wages is high.
Just as with specialized …rms, this may also reduce the number of entrepreneurs entering the market. The mechanism creating multiple equilibria may then again be at work: in low-turnover equilibrium, few venture capitalists enter the market, hence the loss of deferred compensation caused by reduced entrepreneurship is small. In high-turnover equilibrium, by contrast, a large number of venture capitalists enter the market, and distortions associated with low entrepreneurial activity are large.
Discussion
In this section we will discuss some of the assumptions of our model in some detail
The Hosios condition We have assumed that the Hosios condition is satis…ed, so that the search equilibrium maximizes the income of searching workers given the free entry constraint of the …rms. Hence the search market in itself does not create ine¢ ciencies. We will now relax this assumption. The critical assumption in our proof of multiplicity is that
; it is more costly to implement e¤ort in the no-e¤ort equilibrium than in the e¤ort equilibrium. The proof of the inequality builds on the fact that p e (w e p y 2 ) < p n (w n p y 2 ). which in turn builds on the Hosios condition being satis…ed.
First note that due to continuity, the inequality is satis…ed for small deviations from the Hosios condition.
Suppose that the Hosios condition is not satis…ed. Suppose …rst that the workers'bargaining power is higher than the Hosios condition prescribes. In this case wages are too high and p too low so that the search market does not maximize the income of the searching workers. We conjecture that this is more detriminantal to the joint value of search in the e¤ort than in the no-e¤ort equilibrium, since the wages in the e¤ort equilibrium is too high even under the Hosios condition. As a result, the cost of implementing e¤ort is still higher in the no e¤ort equilibrium than in the e¤ort equilibrium so that multiplicity still exists.
Suppose then that the bargaining power of the workers is lower than what the Hosios condition prescribes, so that wages are too low and p too high compared with the values that maximizes the value of the searching worker. This will tend to increase the value of search in the e¤ort equilibrium and reduce the value of search in the no e¤ort equilibrium.
If the deviation from the Hosios condition is su¢ ciently large, we conjecture that the loss of implementing e¤ort is lower in the no e¤ort equilibrium than in the e¤ort equilibrium, in which case multiple equilibria cease to exist.
Our conjecture regarding welfare is analogous. Suppose the workers'bargaining power is higher than the Hosios condition prescribes. From a welfare point of view we conjecture that this will tend to make the no-e¤ort equilibrium more attractive relative to the e¤ort equilibrium. If the workers'bargaining power is lower, we conjecture that the opposite holds.
Note that there may exist a value of the bargaining power which is such that the e¢ cient value of p is realized in the e¤ort equilibrium. Note though that this does not imply that the e¤ort equilibrium is e¢ cient, as workers still search too little.
11 In this paper we assume that e¤ort is observable with a time lag, and this forces …rms to use deferred compensation in order to motivate the worker. However, this is only one reason why deferred compensation may be warranted. Another reason may be that e¤ort is observed in the same period but with noise. We want to demonstrate the need for deferred compensation under this alternative assumption more precisely, and show that also in this case the trade-o¤ between e¤ort provision and e¢ cient turnover arise. We make the following additional assumptions:
1. A worker exerts e¤ort in both periods, so that output in period i is y i = y + e i , where e i is e¤ort in period i, i = 1; 2 11 SÄGA ATT STARTAR PÅ NÅGOT NYTT 2. There is a lower bound on the wage a worker can o¤er in any period. To simplify the exposition we set the lower bound equal to y.
The rest of the model is as before. Let denote the probability that the …rm observes that the worker provides no e¤ort, e = 0. Suppose the contract speci…es that e = e. Suppose this is to be implemented in a period by period basis, without deferred compensation. The highest wage the …rm can pro…tably pay is y + e. The cost of e¤ort is ec. The non-shirking condition reads y + e(1 c) y + e(1 ). High e¤ort can thus only be implemented if c= 1
We assume that this is not the case.
Consider deferred compensation. If a worker that is detected "shirking" in period 1, she cannot pro…table be incentivized in period 2 as c= 1. She thus obtains obtains y in period 2. Consider a contract with deferred compensation, where a worker who is not detected shirking in any period gets w 1 = y in period 1 and w 2 = y + 2e in period 2. The worker will not shirk in period 2 if c= 2. The period 2 utility of a worker is thus 2e+y ce, and independent of wether the worker provided e¤ort in period 1 or not.
In period 1, the lifetime utility of a shirker is 2y + (1 )(2y + 2e ce). The lifetime utility of a non-shirker is 2y + 2e 2ce. The non-shirking condition in period 1 thus reads 2y + 2e 2ce 2y + (1 )(2y + 2e ce); or c= 2 c:
Thus, if the parameters satisfy 1 < c= 2 c; high e¤ort can be implemented if and only if the …rm uses deferred compensation.
The point is that even if the period-by period bonus available is insu¢ cient to motivate the worker, the aggregate surplus over the workers'career is. Deferring the compensation to the end of the second period allows the …rm to use the bonuses in both periods to motivate the worker. This doubles the incentives to exert e¤ort in the second period. Furthermore, since the e¤ort cost in period 2 is less than the bonus available in that period (c < 1), it also increases the incentives to exert e¤ort in period 1. Put di¤erently, with deferred compensation the …rm makes the decision based on two observations instead of one. The increased information increases the scope for implementing a high e¤ort level.
Conclusion
This paper analyses moral hazard in a model of on-the-job search. As worker e¤ort is observed with a time lag, the optimal incentive contract includes deferred compensation.
However, deferred compensation distorts the workers'on-the-job search decisions, as it gives the workers too weak incentives to search on the job. Due to feedback e¤ects between …rms' choice of wage contracts and entry in the on-the-job search market, multiple equilibria may emerge. In one equilibrium, …rms o¤er incentive contracts with deferred compensation, which lead to high e¤ort and low turnover rates. In the other equilibrium …rms do not o¤er deferred compensation, and this lead to low e¤ort and high turnover. Our model contributes to a growing literature that incorporates private information into matching models of the labor market. Our model also sheds light on the observed di¤erences in turnover rates between countries (U.S. and Europe/Japan) and regions (Silicon valley and Massachusetts' route 128).
Our model has several empirical implications. The equilibrium with deferred compensation is more likely to prevail in markets with large search frictions, inclined to give weaker incentives to contractible performance (less use of short-term bonuses) and lead to higher investments in …rm-speci…c human capital than in the equilibrium without deferred compensation. Furthermore, entrepreneurship and venture capital may be more frequent in high-turnover equilibrium than in low-turnover equilibrium. These implications are in line with popular perceptions of the di¤erences between e.g. the US and Japan or between Silicon Valley and Massachusetts.
(ii) Di¤erentiating (33) w.r.t D and p gives 2p 2 D 2p 2 (w p y 2 ) + 2 dD + 2pD D 2(w p y 2 ) dp = 0;
which gives dD dp
Using (33) we have that 2pD D 2(w p y 2 ) = 2 (D ce) p > 0 and hence the numera-
and (using (33))
> 0 the denominator is also positive, hence dD dp
Di¤erentiating (33) w.r.t to D and w p .
We have already shown that the denominator is positive. Hence
The claim that D is increasing in c follows directly from that the left-hand side of (16) is increasing in D and the right-hand side increasing in c.
Appendix 3. Proof of lemma 3
Most of the proof is given in the main text. From equation (18) and assumption 1, we have that p n > 0. From equation (10) and (18) it follows that the probability that a worker …nds a job in a specialized …rm, p n s n , is given by
where the inequality follows directly from assumption 2. This also rationalizes assumption 2.
Appendix 4. Proof of lemma 4
Much of the proof is given in the main text. We only have left to show that (22)- (24) uniquely determines p e , w e p and w 2 (e) = y 2 + D e . The proof is constructed as follows. First we show that equation (22) and (24) show that e D(p) is strictly increasing in p, and thirdly that the equations D = e D(p) and (23) have a unique solution.
1. Equation (22) and (24) uniquely de…nes D = e D(p)
Rewrite (22) to (on generic form)
Hence the two equations (22) and (24) can be condenced to
We …rst want to show that for any p > 0, (34) has a unique solution. To this end, …rst note that f ( y p + (1 )y 2 ) = 0:
For any given p, implementing e¤ort requires that D ce, hence in particular
e., the wage in the no-e¤ort equilibrium). Furthermore, f (y p ) = y p y 0 while D(p; y p ) < y p y 0 for all p. We have just seen that f 0 (w p ) = 
e D(p) is strictly increasing in p.
We want to show that d e D(p) dp > 0. To this end, …rst note that d e D(p) dp dD(p; w p (p)) dp
dw p dp Di¤erentiate (22) to get dw p dp = (1 ) dD dp ; or dD(p; w p (p) dp
From lemma 2 we know that the right-hand side is strictly positive, (
we showed that @D(p;wp) @wp < 1. The claim thus follows.
3. The equations D = e D(p) and (23) have a unique solution.
From (23) we can write D as a function of p, D = g(p), where
which is strictly decreasing in p. Note that g(0) = y p y 2 (with D = y p y 2 , it follows that
. By the de…nition of p n , we know that g(p n ) = 0. 
For c = 0, D = 0, and it follows that the lhs is strictly negative. For c = 1, the last term is zero, and the left-hand side is strictly positive. Due to continuity it follows that 1), the equation has a solution, and b) there is a smallest solution to the equation, which we de…ne as c e . The proposition thus follows. (17) it follows that dp n dA > 0 and dw n p dA = 0. From Lemma (2) it then follows that D n strictly decreases in A. Hence an increase in A makes the no-e¤ort equilibrium more likely.
The proof that a reduction in K makes the no-e¤ort equilibrium more likely is analogous.
From (28) e D e (p) dp > 0. It is thus su¢ cient to show that p e is strictly increasing in A. Suppose not.
Then D e = e D e (p e ) is strictly decreasing in A. Recall that w e 2 = y 2 + D e , which is then strictly decreasing. From (5) it follows that p e is increasing, a contradiction. The proof that a reduction in K makes the no-e¤ort equilibrium more likely is analogous.
Then consider an increase in . We claim that this is equivalent to reducing A. More speci…cally, we will show that if increases from 0 to 0 + , there exists a A > 0 such that if A simultaneously increases from A 0 to A 0 + A, the equilibrium is unchanged. It then follows that an increase in from 0 to 0 + given A = A 0 is equivalent to reducing A from A 0 + A to A 0 given that = 0 + . We have already shown the e¤ects of the latter.
Suppose increases from 0 to 0 + . Suppose there exists a change in A so that the equilibrium is unchanged. The search cost of workers have to stay constant, hence 2) It is su¢ cient to show that the result holds for an increase in y p . It is su¢ cient to show that the loss of implementing e¤ort increases both for the e¤ort-and no-e¤ort equilibrium candidate. Consider …rst the e¤ort equilibrium. Suppose dy p = dD. From (22) it follows that dw p = dy p , and from (5) dp = 0. curve after the shift. It follows that both p and D increases, and hence also the loss of implementing e¤ort. The result then follows.
Consider then the no-e¤ort equilibrium. From (17) and (18) it follows that w p and p increases in y p , and hence also the loss L(p; w p ). The result thus follows.
Proof of proposition 4
First consider the no-e¤ort equilibrium. Since D > ce, it follows that w 2 (e) y 2 + ce. Note that w 2 (e) y p , otherwise p = 0 and w(e) = y 2 + ce < y p . Hence as y p y 2 converges to ec from above, y p w 2 (e) converges to zero. From (5) it then follows that p ! 0. From lemma (15) it follows that L converges to zero. Hence for any c < 1, deviation is not pro…table, and an e¤ort equilibrium exists.
Consider then a no-e¤ort equilibrium. Consider a deviating …rm. Again w 2 (e) > y 2 +ce > y 2 + (y p y 2 ) = w p for y p y 2 su¢ ciently close to ce. Hence the workers in the deviating …rm does not search. But then it follows from Assumption 3 that the deviation is unpro…table
